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NEWLY UNCOVERED CASES
OF HOBSON RESPONDENTS
Because Appellant in its oral argument as
well as in its Reply Brief filed just before hearing
challenges a Rule of Property of long standing in this
state and widely accepted in American Land Jurisprudence
we respectfully ask the Court's consideration of these
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- 3 Intrinsic to a determination of this case is the
necessity to distinguish between boundary by
1
o
oenae and boundary by parol agreement .

aoquies-

We have great respect for and accept as a rule of
property boundary

by aaquiesoenoe

and Utah's long line of

cases which synthesize it- Those cases define the rights
of the parties where there has been a long period of
acquiescence in a fence line but no proof that there was
any agreement as to its location or that the parol

agree-

ment resolved a pre-existing dispute.
However, none of the cases developing boundary
aaquiesoenoe

had as part of its material facts the existen

of an actual agreement between the parties.
the boundary

by

by aaquiesoenoe

It is only

cases which Appellant,

Panguitch Lake Corporation, cites.

Accurately defined by Justice Crockett in Park
Investment Company^ 29 U2d 42l> 511 P2d 145.

Daughters

>

'Brown vs. Milliner,
120 U 16, 232 P2d 202; Tripp vs. Bagl
74 U 57, 267 P 912; Rydalch vs. Anderson, 37 U 99, 107 P
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 4 I.

BOUNDARY BY PAROL REAFFIRMED IN BROWN
VS. MILLINERl DOES NOT REQUIRE A "LONG
PERIOD OF ACQUIESCENCE" AND IS SUPPORTED
ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY BY THE AUTHORITIES.

In oral argument and in its Reply Brief
Panguitch Lake Corporation claims Brown vs.
120 U 16, 232 P2d 202,

is dicta

Milliner,

in this pronouncement:

"A review of the Utah cases involving boundary
disputes reveals that it has long been
recognized in this State that when the
location of the true boundary between two
adjoining tracts of land is unknown,
uncertain or in dispute, the owners thereof,
may, by parol agreement, establish the
boundary line and thereby irrevocably bind
themselves and their grantees."
That statement, clearly requiring no long period
of acquiescence, is not only not dicta

as we will demon-

strate hereinafter, but represents the great weight of
authority.
All the following cases hold that a period of
acquiescence less than the statutory period for adverse
possession is sufficient to establish boundary

by

parol

where a fence line is agreed upon between the parties.

Digitized
the Howard
Hunter202.
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
120 Uby16,
232 W.
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- 5ALA. Guy vs. Lancaster3

34 So. 2d 103 250 Ala 256.

ARK. Havlik vs. Freeman, 218 SW2d 3643 214 Ark 761.
FLA. (U.S.C.A applying Florida law)
International
Paper Co. vs. Bridges3 279 F2d 536.
GA.

Collins vs. Birchfield3
110 SE2d 368;
Clay vs. Stanfield3
119 SE2d 564;
Eethcook vs. Padgett3 122 SE2d3 213.

IDA. Campbell vs.

Weisbrod3 45 P2d 1052.

ILL.

Ginther vs. Duginger3 129 NE2d 147; 6 III 2d 4
Cienki vs. Russell,
75 NE2d 3723 398 III 77;
Skinner vs. Furman3 88 NE2d 8673 404 III 356.

KAN.

Spencer vs. Supemois3 268 P2d 9463 176 Kan 13
Appeal of Moore3 252 P2d 8753 173 Kan 820.

MICH. Becker vs.
Cochran vs.
Jackson vs.
Johnson vs.
Escher vs.
NEB.

Phillips

Weaver, 202 NW2d 439;
Milligan3 101 NW2d 292;
Deernar3 127 NW2d 856;
Squires3 75 NW2d 453 344 Mich 687;
Bender3 61 NW2d 1433 338 Mich I.

vs. Horn3 196 NW2d 3823 188 Neb 304.

NEW MEX. Sanchez vs. Scott3
WASH. Johnston

516 P2d 6673 85 N.M. 695

vs. Monahan3 469 P2d 931.

WISC. Thiel vs. Damarau3 66 NW2d 7473 268 Wis 76.
Some of these cases hold that there need be no
period of acquiescence if the boundary is fixed by an
agreement resolving a bona fide controversy based upon
doubt concerning the true line followed by erection of a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 6permanent boundary.
No case we have found requires acquiescence or
possession beyond the statutory period for adverse possession.
KeHgan vs. Thomas, 281 So.2d 410, says that all
that is required is:
"Sufficient time to show a settled recognition of the permanent boundary."
The Michigan case of Becker

vs. Weaver holds that

there is no legal justification for imposing the minimum
statutory time where the boundary is based upon a parol
agreement.
A mutual promise to abide by the results is sufficient consideration for an agreement between co-terminus
owners of land as to an uncertain boundary line. Guy vs.
Lancaster,

34 S02d 10, 250 Ala 256.

The parol agreement is not. a violation of the
Statute of Frauds because it does not transfer an
interest in land but is a determination of the location
of the existing estates. Tripp vs. Bagley,
276 P 912.

See Brown vs. Milliner,

74 U 57,

232 P2d at 207.
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ways a
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«»

fencetine may establish a boundary in employing this
language:
* * *. It is therefore clear that defendants1
claim to the land in controversy must
stand or fall either upon an express
agreement fixing the boundary line OR
upon acquiescence in the boundary line
between the land owned by
Plaintiff
and that owned by defendant.[74
U at Page 66.]
No Utah case is to the contrary.
In their Reply Brief the Appellants insist that
all the foregoing statements are merely dictum.

This is

simply not true.
Mere possession of real property without payment
of taxes will never

ripen into title (78-12-12 UCA 1953);

therefore this Court to support the doctrine of
by acquiescence

was obliged to adopt, as an essential

predicate, boundary

by parol.

How has the Court done so'

By clothing long acquiescence with a presumption
contract

boundary

in fact

that

a

existed.

Thus, the only office which "long acquiescence"
ful fills is the two-fold purpose to provide (1) an
irrebutable presumption that a parol agreement was enterec
into
and
A W.
rebuttal
presumption
said
agreement
Digitized
by the(2)
Howard
Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clarkthat
Law School,
BYU.
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-8was consummated due to a dispute or uncertain concerning location of the true boundary. Motzkus vs.
Carroll,

7 P2d 237, 322 P2d 391.

Justice Crockett's concurring opinion in Hummel
vs. Young, I P2d 237, 265 P2d 410, is to the effect

that an express contract is not necessary to the establishment of a boundary line by acquiescence,

implying

that if an express contract is proved a long period of
acquiescence is not essential
Contrary to being a dictum the identical statements in Brown vs. Milliner,

Tripp

vs. Bagley and Rydalch

vs. Anderson that the parties may, by parol agreement,
establish the boundary line and thereby irrevocably
bind themselves and their grantees, those statements
are an intrinsic element of the ratio
rule of boundary by

decedendi of the

acquiescence.

The doctrime of boundary by parol agreement is a

part of the ratio

decedendi in all these Utah cases be-

cause in none was there any evidence of an agreement, oral
or otherwise. In no case ever decided by this Court was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 9there presented an accumulation of facts where all of
the elementsof boundary

by parol

were present.

Thus, the rule of Brown vs. Milliner,

Tripp vs. Bag-

ley and Rydalch vs. Anderson that when a parol agreement
is executed by erection of a fence it will be enforced,
is a pivotal element the Court must utilize in order to
make a perfected property right out of land affected by
the rule of boundary by acquiescence.

To get from

the point of an unwritten establishment of the respective
estates between co-terminus owners to the point where
the fence, having been acquiesed in for a "long period
of time" determines the boundary, the Court must somewhere along the line imply, infer, or establish by
presumption, that there was an agreement between the
parties.
Thus, Rydalch,

Tripp

and Brown synthesize this

rule:
If there is no actual proof of
elements of boundary by parol,
long period of acquiescence in
fence supplies the presumption
agreement between the
parties.

the
then a
the
of an

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the case now before the Court all the essential
elements of boundary

by parol

agreement

are proved without

contradiction or qualification:
1] Hobson and Marsden were adjoining proprietors
( R.252, 293-295)
2] Hobson wanted to know where his lines were going
to be (R.248, 146)
3] Hobson wanted a survey (R.146)
4] Marsden declined assuring Hobson he "knew his
land w e i r (R. 146)
5] A boundary was agreed upon between the parties
(R.185)
6] The boundary line was clearly marked on the
ground by a third party while the adjoining
proprietors were present (R.140-225)
7] A substantial permanent fence was established
along the line (R.185-188, 276)
8] Both parties rely on the fence (R.400)
9] The fenceline is torn down ten years later unilaterallj
by the Defendants (R.353, 354)
10] The fence stood as the boundary up to which both
parties occupied for much longer than Utah Statute
of Limitations for adverse possession (78-12-5 et seq.
UCA 1953).
In additional to those facts, Hobson built a
subdivision
using
the Law
established
fenceline
Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter
Library, J. Reuben Clark
Law School, as
BYU.his west
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11 boundary (R.40Q), sold lots from said subdivision
staked on the ground as though the west boundary of
his subdivision were the west boundary of the sectional
subdivision (R.401, 402). Hobson had no reason to suspect otherwise.

Hobson paid taxes on an increased

assessment (R.402) and upon lots which were actually
within this disputed tract of land (R.265-290; 403).

Ringwood vs. Bradford, 2 U2d 119, 269 P2d 1052;
Jensen vs. Bartlett,

4 U2d 58, 286 P2d 804 and Ekberg

vs. Bates, 121 U 122, 239 P2d 205, are all cases where
there was insufficient evidence of one of the elements of
boundary by parol agreement and the Court applied the
presumption or indulged

the fiction

that the absent

elements or those which have not been supported by the
proof were present.
"Acquiescence" in those cases only supplies a
presumption that there was an agreement at a time when
the true location of the boundary was unknown, uncertain,
or in dispute.
If a boundary can be established by a presumption
why
cannot the same boundary be established by actual
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 12 proof of the facts presumed.
We respectfully submit that the rule of Brown
vs. .Milliner3 Tripp

vs. Bagley^ Rydalch vs.. Anderson is no

dictum but is an established, settled law of this state,
an important rule of property therein, and in harmony
with the overwhelming weight of authority.
CONCLUSION
Boundary by parol

agreement is an integral

part of this Court's well-established rule of boundary
by

acquiescence.

Because mere possession without payment of
taxes will never ripen into title (78-12 UCA 1953) this
Court, to support the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
was obliged to adopt, as an essential predicate, boundary by parol.

This Court has done so by clothing

long acquiescence with a presumption that a parol
agreement existed - which was the product of uncertainty,
doubt or dispute between adjoining proprietors, and which
culminated in erection of the boundary fence.
If boundary by parol agreement is rejected,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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boundary by long acquiescence is destroyed.
Respectfully submitted.
Ken Chamberlain, Attorney for
Hobson Respondents

SERVED the within and foregoing Brief of Newly Uncovered
Cases upon the following by mailing two (2) full, true,
and correct copies thereof, U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid,
this 26th day of November, 1974:
J. Anthony Eyre, Kipp & Christian, Attorneys for
Appellants, 520 Boston Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah (84111)
Thorpe Waddingham, Attorney for Respondents,
Delta, Utah (84624)
Paul M. Hansen, Attorney for Respondent, 819 Oak
Street, Ogden, Utah
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